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Notes 
The Case for Uniform Hot News Preemption 
Joshua Korr* 
Hot news misappropriation is a ninety-year-old tort that provides a quasi-property right 
in factual information to fact-gathering organizations. When available, the right prevents 
free riders from copying factual information while it remains hot. The question is whether 
section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts hot news misappropriation claims in all 
circumstances. Although courts have had little trouble finding that most misappropriation 
claims are preempted, the issue is complicated in the hot news context by legislative 
history suggesting that hot news claims survive preemption. That suggestion conflicts with 
the actual language of the Copyright Act’s preemption provision, which seems to require 
the universal preemption of hot news claims.  
 
In the 1990s, hot news cases were rare enough that one might have reasonably concluded 
that the tort had died out. Nonetheless, courts left open the suggestion that a hypothetical 
hot news claim might survive preemption. There the issue might have remained, but 
revolutionary technological expansion has made copying, the actus reus of hot news 
misappropriation, exponentially more harmful to traditional fact gathering organizations. 
In recent years, the hot news tort rose from its dormancy through aggressive litigation by 
institutions like the Associated Press and Barclays Capital Inc. Because these lawsuits are 
anti-competitive and threaten the public domain, it is time to put the specter of hot news to 
rest. Fortunately, faithful application of section 301 of the Copyright Act compels that 
exact result. This Note presents the case for uniform hot news preemption.  
 
 * J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013, and Executive Notes Editor 
of the Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professor Margreth Barrett for her insightful 
comments, Professor Geoffrey Hazard for his wisdom, Dr. Kenneth Korr for his logic and work ethic, 
and Mary Korr, my lifelong editor. Also, a special thank you to the members of the Hastings Law 
Journal staff who spend countless hours making each issue of the journal more perfect. 
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Introduction 
Exponential technological growth has defined the twenty-first 
century, especially in the field of information technology. As a result, 
factual information is transmitted at ever-increasing speeds to an 
increasingly global audience. For example, when a politician makes a 
controversial comment, that statement is copied and transmitted to 
thousands of websites in a matter of minutes. Rapid factual exchange is 
beneficial to society because it encourages cultural dialogue through 
public debate, satire, and parody. That benefit has constitutional origins: 
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution allows Congress to 
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grant private property rights to intellectual property.1 The negative 
implication, according to the Supreme Court, is that facts—which are not 
authored—are not capable of private ownership.2 On a fundamental 
level, our democracy depends on factually driven critical discourse. 
Factual property rights are antithetical to that discourse. 
While the public benefits from fast and easy access to facts, news 
organizations and financial consulting firms have experienced a dramatic 
decline in profits over the past decade.3 Both industries pin part of the 
blame on news aggregators that republish facts without bearing the cost 
of discovery.4 While facts themselves are not a depletable resource,5 fast 
and free access to current factual information depletes the value of that 
information and impedes fact-gathering organizations from monetizing a 
return on their investments. As a result, organizations like the Associated 
Press and Barclays Capital have raised “hot news” misappropriation 
claims to stop news aggregators from free-riding off of their investments.6 
These organizations contend that if direct competitors can appropriate 
content at a fraction of the cost and offer it at a lower price, the “reading 
public [will] suffer because no one [will] have an incentive to collect ‘hot 
news.’”7 
A hot news claim arises when a defendant copies time-sensitive 
factual information from a plaintiff in lieu of discovering those facts 
independently. While hot news plaintiffs are primarily concerned with 
enjoining defendants from free-riding, monetary damages are also 
available. Hot news claims have largely been unsuccessful because courts 
have held that they are preempted by section 301 of the 1976 Copyright 
Act (“Copyright Act”).8 Courts have preempted hot news claims under 
an interpretation of § 301 that causes significant policy problems.9 The 
heart of § 301 is the two-prong preemption test contained in § 301(a). 
The first prong asks whether the subject matter of the litigation—here 
 
 1. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings . . . .”). 
 2. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
 3. See Richard A. Posner, The Future of Newspapers, Becker-Posner Blog (June 23, 2009, 
7:37 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Unlike physical resources (oil, for example), facts are not a depletable resource. They are 
capable of endless consumption. No matter how many people learn the fact that humans have 
contributed substantially to changes in the Earth’s climate, countless others may learn that fact. In 
contrast, once I burn a gallon of oil, it is depleted. 
 6.  See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 7. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 8. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012). 
 9. See infra Part III.C. 
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“hot” factual information—falls within the scope of the Copyright Act.10 
The second prong asks whether the cause of action vindicates rights that 
are “equivalent” to the ones protected by the Copyright Act.11 In a hot 
news case, those rights include the right to control the reproduction of 
factual content. Taken together, if a claim seeks to protect the same 
subject matter as the Copyright Act with the same rights as the 
Copyright Act, it is preempted. 
This Note focuses on whether the Copyright Act uniformly 
preempts hot news claims. Though no court has explicitly held this, hot 
news claims should be uniformly preempted and the doctrine should be 
discarded as a potentially viable cause of action because it is inconsistent 
with § 301. This issue is relevant in light of the recent Second Circuit 
decision, Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc. 
(“Barclays”),12 and its relation to the formerly seminal hot news case 
National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc. (“NBA”).13 This Note argues 
that both cases incorrectly interpret § 301’s second prong. 
In NBA, the Second Circuit held that a hot news claim theoretically 
survives preemption if it contains “extra elements” that set the claim 
outside of the general scope of the Copyright Act.14 Those extra elements 
are: “(i) the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free-
riding by a defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the 
product or service provided by the plaintiff.”15 The NBA three-part test 
has come to define the parameters of non-preempted hot news claims in 
a majority of the federal circuits. But NBA’s three “extra elements” fail 
to save a hot news claim from preemption because those elements do not 
vindicate rights that are different from a copyright holder’s exclusive 
rights.16 The real question under the second prong of § 301—and the 
central question of this Note—is whether a hot news claim ever 
vindicates rights that are “qualitatively different” from the ones 
protected by the Copyright Act.17 
In Barclays, the Second Circuit revised its approach to hot news 
claims.18 There, the court characterized NBA’s three-part test as dicta.19 
But the Barclays court adhered to NBA’s view that an appropriately 
 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 13. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 14. Id. at 853 
 15. Id. 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 19. Id. at 899–901.  
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narrow hot news claim might survive Copyright Act preemption.20 For 
these reasons, Barclays reached the appropriate result in the case before 
it—a finding of preemption—but nonetheless reinforced NBA’s acute 
logical flaws. 
Even if NBA correctly suggested that hot news claims survive 
preemption, a viable hot news misappropriation doctrine is bad policy.21 
First, the doctrine is anticompetitive because it allows large media 
corporations to crush small competitors under the weight of litigation. 
Second, hot news claims will encroach on the public domain. Third, hot 
news claims are minimally useful. Though hot news plaintiffs point to 
rapidly dwindling profits and claim that misappropriation will lead to the 
end of news gathering, misappropriation has not caused the large-scale 
problems of the newspaper industry. The real causes are changing 
consumer preferences, dwindling newspaper circulation, the loss of 
classified ad and print revenue, the inability of digital revenue to fill the 
void, and the loss of the geographical monopolies that insulated local 
newspapers for much of the twentieth century. 
This Note distills the entire line of hot news cases into a coherent 
whole and proposes a framework to guide future courts. Part I outlines the 
emergence of the hot news doctrine from its earliest roots in International 
News Service v. Associated Press and its subsequent treatment under the 
1976 Copyright Act. Part II refutes the NBA court’s conclusion that an 
appropriately narrow hot news claim theoretically survives Copyright Act 
preemption. Part III discusses the logical problems inherent in the 
Barclays decision and argues that a viable hot news cause of action is bad 
policy. Part IV concludes that uniformly preempting hot news claims is 
consistent with section 301 of the Copyright Act and reflects sound public 
policy. 
I.  The Doctrinal Evolution of Hot News  
Misappropriation Claims 
The viability of hot news misappropriation claims is best understood 
on a bell curve. The doctrine originated in the Supreme Court’s 1918 
case International News Service v. Associated Press (“INS”), which also 
created the broader doctrine of misappropriation.22 Hot news claims are 
a subset of misappropriation claims that specifically concern time-
sensitive factual content. Although INS’s holding was subsequently 
nullified by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,23 INS-like misappropriation 
 
 20.  Id. at 898. 
 21. See infra Part III.C. 
 22. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 23. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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claims rooted in state common law enjoyed substantial growth in the 
years following INS.24 Broad use of the doctrine reached its zenith in the 
1950s and 1960s because significant gaps in the 1909 Copyright Act left 
valuable content unprotected.25 But misappropriation and hot news 
entered a period of decline following the passage of the 1976 Copyright 
Act and its broad preemption provision.26 
A.  The Origin of Hot News: INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE V. ASSOCIATED 
PRESS 
The INS case arose amid unusual circumstances. During World War 
I, William Randolph Hearst—the American owner of the International 
News Service (“INS”)—publicly sided with Germany.27 In response, 
British and French censors barred INS from sending war dispatches from 
Europe to the United States.28 Because INS feared that it would lose 
substantial market share to the Associated Press (“AP”) if it did not 
cover the war, it systematically re-wrote, and sometimes directly copied, 
AP’s war dispatches and sold them to INS-affiliated newspapers while 
the news was still hot.29 The Supreme Court decided that it was 
fundamentally inequitable for INS to “reap where it had not sown”30 and 
enjoined INS from copying the underlying facts from AP news articles 
“until its commercial value as news had passed away.”31 The Court 
reasoned that a systemic pattern of indiscriminate free-riding by direct 
competitors was intolerable because it would in effect “cut off the service 
by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison with the return.”32 The 
 
 24. See, e.g., Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Record Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950), aff’d, 
107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951). 
 25.  See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (currently 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–22 (2012)). 
 26.  See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). 
 27. Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 621, 627 (2003). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 216 (1918). 
 30. Id. at 239. To “reap where one has not sown” is the foundation of a moral theory of 
misappropriation that views free-riding pejoratively. But when it comes to copying, the Copyright Act 
clearly tolerates some acts of free-riding that are useful to society, and this includes factual copying. 
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). The moral theory of 
misappropriation itself has been squarely rejected, and thus it is impossible to tell what free-riding is 
moral or immoral except by reference to free-riding that is prohibited by law. See Fin. Info., Inc. v. 
Moody’s Investors Servs., 808 F.2d 205, 208–09 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 31. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 232. 
 32. Id. at 241. For a critique of INS, see Posner, supra note 27, at 628 (challenging the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that INS’s free-riding threatened the continued vitality of AP’s business because 
INS’s free-riding was limited in scope and in time: “INS was not paraphrasing all the AP’s dispatches, 
just those concerning the war in Europe. And it was doing so not to save money but because it was 
prevented by the British and French censors from reporting from the war zone. This was a special 
situation . . . and [was] therefore unlikely to be a serious threat to the continued viability of AP.”). 
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Court’s rationale laid the foundation for the Second Circuit’s three-part 
NBA test some eighty years later. 
After INS, the scope of the misappropriation doctrine took center 
stage in the Second Circuit case Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.33 In that 
case, Doris Silk directly copied Cheney Brothers’ silk scarf design while 
it was fashionable.34 Cheney Brothers brought an INS misappropriation 
claim and requested an eight-month injunction that corresponded to the 
length of time that a scarf design remained “hot” in the fashion world.35 
Judge Learned Hand disagreed: He was concerned that granting Cheney 
Brothers an injunction would perpetuate a dual system of common-law 
and federal copyrights where rights varied from state to state and 
between federal and state court.36 Limiting INS to its facts, Judge Hand 
stated: 
[I]f [INS] meant to lay down a general doctrine, it would cover this 
case . . . . We do not believe that it did. . . . [W]e think that no more was 
covered than situations substantially similar to those then at bar . . . . 
We are to suppose that the court meant to create a sort of common-law 
patent or copyright for reasons of justice. Either would flagrantly 
conflict with the scheme which Congress has for more than a century 
devised to cover the subject-matter.37 
Judge Hand’s analysis emphasizes the importance of the uniform 
application of federal copyright law across the United States. His 
conclusions coincide with the broad preemptive scope of the 1976 
Copyright Act.38 Judge Hand also voiced skepticism because Cheney 
Brothers’ silk scarf designs, unlike factual information, were eligible for 
copyright protection.39 A separate line of cases emerged after Cheney Bros. 
that dealt primarily with content that was not protected by the 1909 
Copyright Act. 
In Metropolitan Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Record Corp. 
(“Metropolitan Opera”), Metropolitan Opera brought a misappropriation 
claim to enjoin Wagner-Nichols from making and selling copies of its live 
opera radio broadcasts.40 The 1909 Copyright Act did not extend copyright 
protection to live broadcasts because they failed the fixation requirement.41 
 
 33. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 34. Id. at 279. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 280. 
 37. Id. 
 38.  See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). 
 39. Cheney Bros., 35 F.2d at 279. 
 40. 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (1950). 
 41. Under the current Copyright Act, copyright extends to works of authorship that are fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Live broadcasts, of course, are not fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression, although recordings of those broadcasts are. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. 
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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Still, the district court granted an injunction under the broad “principle 
that property rights of commercial value are to be and will be protected 
from any form of commercial immorality.”42 Metropolitan Opera’s 
suggestion that misappropriation has a moral component is notable but 
flawed. The suggestion is notable for hot news cases because free-riding, 
the actus reus of hot news defendants, connotes wrongful (i.e., immoral) 
copying. The suggestion is flawed because it confuses normative wrongs 
with legal wrongs. Cases interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act have 
overwhelmingly rejected a moral theory of misappropriation that is not 
directly tethered to a legal wrong.43 
B. The 1976 Copyright Act 
Passage of the 1976 Copyright Act caused a decline in 
misappropriation claims and specifically hot news claims. There are two 
notable aspects of the 1976 Amendments. First, Congress expanded the 
types of copyrightable subject matter to protect several categories of 
works that were previously ineligible for copyright protection, including 
simultaneous broadcasts.44 Second, Congress included § 301, which is a 
broad preemption provision that protects the uniform application of 
federal copyright law: “[T]he federal legislative scheme . . . is best 
understood as implying[] a jurisdictional purpose on the part of Congress 
to occupy the field.”45 Section 301(a) states: 
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive 
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 
in works of authorship that . . . come within the subject matter of 
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . . are governed 
exclusively by this title.46 
Thus, § 301(a) contemplates a two-prong inquiry that compares a 
state-created cause of action to the subject matter and the general scope 
 
 42. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071, 
1099–101 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Metro. 
Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950)). Under 
a moral theory of misappropriation, a defendant can be liable solely on the basis of conduct that 
appears immoral in the eyes of the court. Id. In INS, for example, the Supreme Court found INS’s 
copying immoral because it enabled INS to reap where it had not sown, and thus to obtain an unfair 
advantage of AP. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918). This theory of 
liability has been replaced by a theory of liability that focuses on property rights—a defendant’s 
copying is illegal if it infringes on the plaintiff’s legally enforceable right to the information and it is 
illegal if the information is in the public domain. See Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc. 
808 F.2d 204, 208–09 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 43. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Fin. Info., 808 F.2d 205. 
 44. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–02. 
 45. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1172–73 (3d ed. 1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 46. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (emphasis added). 
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of the Copyright Act—that is, the rights protected by the Act. In a hot 
news case, the central question under the subject matter prong is whether 
time-sensitive factual information falls within the subject matter of 
copyright even though that information is not copyrightable.47 Courts 
have answered this question affirmatively: Facts do come within the 
subject matter of copyright even though they are not copyrightable.48 The 
central question under the general scope prong is whether the rights that 
a hot news claim protects are equivalent to the rights afforded to 
copyright holders.49 This Note answers this affirmatively: A hot news 
misappropriation claim is only preempted if the answer to both of these 
questions is yes. 
The confusing legislative history behind § 301, which went through 
some notable and controversial changes, is a primary reason that hot 
news misappropriation claims have survived longer than other 
misappropriation claims. On June 13, 1975, the Senate added an 
illustrative list of claims that might survive preemption in appropriate 
circumstances as § 301(b)(3).50 That list included “rights against 
misappropriation” that were not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
specified in section 106 of the Copyright Act.51 This directly bears on 
whether hot news claims are preempted, as the Senate Judiciary 
Committee report accompanying the Copyright Act explains: 
[S]tate law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy . . . against a 
consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of 
the facts (i.e., not the literary expression) constituting “hot” news, 
whether in the traditional mold of International News Service v. 
Associated Press, or in the newer form of data updates from scientific, 
business, or financial data bases.52 
The Senate Report expressly states that hot news claims survive 
preemption. However, it is not clear why an INS-like claim would survive 
preemption given that misappropriation “is a broad, common law 
anticopying doctrine” that is inherently at odds with the Copyright Act’s 
preemption provision.53 In any event, reliance on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s report is misplaced because the report corresponds to a 
portion of § 301 that was removed from the Copyright Act prior to 
publication at the request of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 
 
 47. See infra Part II.A. 
 48. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. 340; Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 49. See infra Part II.B. 
 50. See S. 22, 94th Cong. § 301, at 33 (1975). 
 51. Id. 
 52. S. Rep. No. 473, at 116 (1975) (citation omitted); see H.R. Rep. No. 1476, at 132 (1976). 
 53. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the 
United States and Abroad, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 157 (1997). 
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The DOJ opposed enumerating misappropriation in § 301(b)(3) 
because it feared that the provision would allow state law claims that made 
“actionable the mere unauthorized reproduction of a work” to survive 
preemption.54 This, they claimed, would make the preemption 
meaningless.55 The DOJ’s fears were unfounded because the list of non-
preempted claims in § 301(b)(3) was explicitly subject to the preemption 
standard set out in § 301(a). Thus, § 301(a) would not have been rendered 
meaningless because it trumped the illustrative list in § 301(b)(3). 
Regardless, Congress agreed with the DOJ and deleted the language in 
§ 301(b)(3) that explicitly saved non-equivalent misappropriation claims 
from preemption.56 But Congress inexplicably retained the Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s suggestion that an INS-like misappropriation claim 
might survive preemption. It republished that sentiment verbatim in the 
House Judiciary Committee Report (“House Report”) that accompanied 
the bill.57 
Judicial reliance on the House Report, though widespread, is 
misplaced. Because the House Report refers to an earlier version of the 
Copyright Act, scholars suggest that it “should not be taken as persuasive 
evidence of Congress’s intent.”58 “[M]ore likely, those involved in 
drafting the House Report simply did not carefully examine exactly why 
International News-type claims should survive preemption.”59 Nimmer on 
Copyright suggests that because the legislative history is ambiguous with 
respect to misappropriation, courts ought to rely exclusively on the 
language of the statute.60 William Patry argues that, in light of the 
“refusal by some judges to rely on legislative report language, it is 
insufficient to merely cite to report language if there is concern that 
language is contrary to the statute.”61 However, in light of the Copyright 
Act’s contradictory legislative history, courts failed to appreciate the full 
preemptive scope of § 301 in hot news cases. 
 
 54. See William F. Patry, 6 Patry on Copyrights § 18:8 (2012). Patry goes on to explain that the 
DOJ’s fears were likely unfounded based on the statutory language that incorporated limitations from 
§ 301(a) into (b)(3). Id. 
 55. See 122 Cong. Rec. 32,015 (Sept. 22, 1976) (explaining why § 301 was amended to exclude the 
misappropriation savings provision). 
 56. Id. Section 301(b)(3)’s use of the phrase “non-equivalent” expressly invokes § 301(a)’s 
general scope prong. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (“[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent 
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are governed exclusively by this 
title.” (emphasis added)). 
 57. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, at 132. 
 58. Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 162 n.46. 
 59. Nicholas Khadder, National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 1998 Berkeley Tech. 
L.J. 3, 17. 
 60. See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.01[B][1][f][iv] (1997). 
 61. Patry, supra note 54, § 18:40. 
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C.  Courts Struggle to Interpret § 301 in Hot News Cases 
Prior to NBA, there were two categories of hot news cases: those 
that failed to acknowledge § 301, and those that failed to appreciate its 
full preemptive scope. Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, 
Inc.62 is representative of the former category. In Standard & Poor’s, 
Standard & Poor’s sued to prevent Commodity Exchange from copying 
its weighted compilation of stocks (factual information) for use on 
Commodity Exchange’s stock exchange.63 Standard & Poor’s pled several 
causes of action at the district court level, including copyright 
infringement and misappropriation.64 The district court granted a 
preliminary injunction that was upheld on appeal to the Second Circuit.65 
However, the Second Circuit did not discuss § 301 and the obvious 
preemption problems facing Standard & Poor’s misappropriation claim.66 
This is not an isolated omission. Several other courts have failed to 
appreciate the broad preemptive scope of § 301 in the wake of the 1976 
Act and erroneously upheld INS-like misappropriation claims.67 
However, certain courts gradually began to head in the right direction. 
In Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Service (“FII”), 
the Second Circuit held that § 301 preempted a misappropriation claim 
that sought to enjoin the unauthorized copying of non-copyrightable 
bond reports.68 However, the FII court reached the right result for the 
wrong reason because it relied on the House Report to assess § 301’s 
second prong. The court stated: “The legislative history attempts to 
describe the forms of unfair competition which are ‘equivalent’ to rights 
protected by federal copyright law and which are not . . . .”69 Thus, citing 
the House Report, FII stated in dicta that hot news claims are “a branch 
of the unfair competition doctrine not preempted by the Copyright 
Act.”70 Although the court opined that hot news claims theoretically 
survive preemption, it held that FII’s claim simply was not hot: “[T]o the 
extent that Moody’s did copy from FII, the information it published 
 
 62. 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 63. Id. at 706. 
 64.  Id. at 707. 
 65.  Id. at 709–10. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See, e.g., Lynch, Jones, & Ryan, Inc. v. Standard & Poor’s, No. 117064/97, 1998 WL 574166 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 11, 1998); Bd. of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 98 Ill. 2d 109 (1983). But see U.S. 
Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1041 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a misappropriation 
claim for the use of a mathematical formula failed to make out a prima facie case for misappropriation 
under New Jersey law, but also failing to discuss § 301’s preemptive effect on that claim). 
 68. 808 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 69. Id. at 208. 
 70. Id. at 209. 
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would have been at least ten days old.”71 Part II.C.1 explains why, even if 
FII’s information had been hot, its claim is preempted by § 301. 
FII, though imperfect, was a step in the right direction. The decision 
successfully refuted the moral theory of misappropriation upon which 
cases like Metropolitan Opera and INS relied.72 FII stands for the 
commonly accepted proposition that the wrongfulness of a defendant’s 
unauthorized copying depends on whether that copying violates the law, 
not upon amorphous concepts of morality.73 “If, for example, the work is 
in the public domain, then its use would not be wrongful. Likewise, if, as 
here, the work is unprotected by federal law because of lack of 
originality, then its use is neither unfair nor unjustified.”74 
Following FII, the Supreme Court paved the way for uniform hot 
news preemption in a non-hot-news case, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.75 In Feist, Rural Telephone compiled the names 
and phone numbers of its subscribers into a phonebook.76 When Rural’s 
competitor, Feist Publications, copied the names and phone numbers 
from Rural’s phonebook and reproduced them in its own phonebook, 
Rural sued for copyright infringement.77 The Court rejected Rural’s claim 
because the information in the phonebook was not sufficiently original to 
qualify for copyright protection.78 The Court stated that it “may seem 
unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used by 
others without compensation. . . . [H]owever, this is not some unforeseen 
by-product of a statutory scheme. It is, rather, the essence of copyright, 
and a constitutional requirement.”79 This quotation suggests that facts fall 
within the subject matter of the Copyright Act—even though they are 
not copyright eligible—because the Copyright Act intentionally left 
factual information in the public domain. 
The Court also suggested that there is a constitutional right to 
appropriate factual material that is embedded in the Intellectual Property 
Clause, which extends to situations in which others have labored to 
discover that material.80 Some argue that the Court “announced 
constitutional principles that would invalidate an INS-type 
misappropriation claim . . . even if it was Congress’s clear intention to 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 208. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 76.  Id. at 342. 
 77.  Id. at 343. 
 78.  Id. at 364. 
 79. Id. at 349 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. Id. 
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permit the states to extend such protection.”81 One commentator has gone 
so far as to suggest that “because there is a constitutional right of 
appropriation, there cannot be a state claim of misappropriation of such 
material.”82 However, information providers have sought sui generis 
legislation for factual compilations and databases.83 They argue that fact-
protecting legislation is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.84 
Constitutional arguments aside, the Feist Court’s statements about the 
subject matter of copyright strengthen the subject matter analysis in NBA. 
II.  NBA v. MOTOROLA and the Extra Elements Test 
NBA is the seminal hot news case. Its “extra elements” test has been 
adopted in a majority of jurisdictions.85 The case involved an innovative 
sports-facts application that Motorola developed to transmit real-time 
information about NBA games to cellular phones.86 Motorola gathered 
that information by collecting data from live NBA broadcasts.87 The 
NBA filed a hot news claim alleging that Motorola unlawfully 
misappropriated the underlying facts of NBA games without bearing the 
expense of producing those games.88 Motorola raised federal preemption 
as its defense.89 
The NBA decision provides an excellent vehicle to analyze both 
parts of the § 301 two-prong test for preemption. This Part uses the lower 
court’s opinion90 to explain why hot news claims meet the § 301 subject 
matter requirement and uses the appellate court’s opinion to explain why 
hot news claims meet the § 301 general scope requirement. A claim is 
only preempted if it meets both prongs of § 301. Even though the subject 
matter debate is now settled, satisfying the first prong of § 301(a) is 
necessary to support an argument for uniform hot news preemption. 
 
 81. Patry, supra note 54, § 18:40. 
 82. Id. 
 83. H.R. Rep. No. 108-421, pt. 1, at 8 (2004). 
 84. Id. at 15. 
 85. See, e.g., Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 960 (7th Cir. 2006); Agora 
Fin., LLC v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499 (D. Md. 2010); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 
1102, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Fred 
Wehrenberger Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999); 
Scranton Times, L.P. v. Wilkes-Barre Publ’g Co., No. 3:08-cv-2135, 2009 WL 3100963, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 
Sept. 23, 2009). 
 86. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843–44 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
 87. Id. at 844. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 843. 
 90. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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A.  Hot News Falls Within the Subject Matter of the Copyright Act 
The first prong of § 301(a) requires courts to determine whether a 
state law claim comes “within the subject matter of copyright as specified 
by sections 102 and 103.”91 In other words, did the Copyright Act 
legislate with respect to the subject matter allegedly misappropriated—
here the historical facts that occur during NBA basketball games? Before 
NBA, it was not clear if facts fell within the subject matter of copyright 
because facts themselves were ineligible for copyright protection. 
In NBA, the district court held that the underlying facts of an NBA 
basketball game—as opposed to the live broadcast of the game—did not 
fall within the subject matter of copyright.92 Nimmer and Nimmer 
support this theory, otherwise known as partial preemption. “[P]re-
emption may be avoided . . . . [because] the subject matter of 
misappropriation falls outside copyright’s sphere to the extent that it 
applies to facts per se, which are ineligible for statutory copyright 
protection.”93 However, the partial preemption theory does not fully 
comport with § 301. 
Section 301 requires a comparison between the subject matter at 
issue in a lawsuit and the subject matter contained in sections 102 and 
103 of the Copyright Act. Sections 102 and 103 both describe material 
that is eligible for copyright protection,94 and also material that is not 
eligible for copyright protection.95 Thus, the mere fact that content is 
ineligible for copyright protection does not mean that it falls outside the 
subject matter defined in sections 102 and 103 of the Act. For example, 
“compilations of facts are within the subject matter of copyright,”96 but 
§ 103(b) limits the scope of the copyright to the material authored by the 
copyright holder, which excludes any preexisting facts contained within 
the work. Section 102(b) also excludes facts from copyright protection: 
“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
 
 91. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
 92. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 939 F. Supp. at 1088.  
 93. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 60, § 1.01[B][2][a]. 
 94. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship . . . . 
Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including 
any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and 
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.”); see also id. § 103(a) (“The 
subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works.”). 
 95. See id. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” 
(emphasis added)); see also id. § 103(b) (“The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends 
only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting 
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.”). 
 96. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
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extend to any idea . . . or discovery . . . .”97 According to Feist, facts are 
just such a discovery: “The first person to find and report a particular fact 
has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.”98 
Thus, while facts are not copyrightable, they easily fall within the subject 
matter of copyright as § 301 defines the term. But the district court in 
NBA held otherwise.99 
When Motorola appealed the district court’s ruling in NBA, the 
Second Circuit rejected the district court’s reliance on a partial preemption 
theory.100 It held that the underlying facts of NBA games did meet the 
§ 301 subject matter requirement.101 The court stated: “Copyrightable 
material often contains uncopyrightable elements within it, but Section 
301 preemption bars state law misappropriation claims with respect to 
uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable elements.”102 The court also 
noted that partial preemption does not fit with § 301’s underlying policy in 
favor of uniformity because “a partial preemption doctrine—preemption 
of claims based on misappropriation of broadcasts but no preemption of 
claims based on misappropriation of underlying facts—would expand 
significantly the reach of state law claims and render the preemption 
intended by Congress unworkable.”103 Thus, the Second Circuit rejected 
the district court’s analysis of the § 301 subject matter requirement. 
Once the court concluded that the NBA’s misappropriation claim fell 
within the subject matter of copyright, it necessarily proceeded to analyze 
§ 301’s second prong, the general scope requirement.104 Based on the facts 
in evidence, the Second Circuit held that the NBA’s hot news claim was 
preempted because it fell within the general scope of copyright.105 But the 
court went on to suggest that if a hot news claim contained certain “extra 
elements,” it would not meet the § 301 general scope prong and would 
thus survive preemption.106 The Second Circuit’s extra elements test 
fundamentally misconceives the general scope inquiry. 
B. The General Scope Requirement: Testing Equivalency 
The second prong of the § 301 preemption analysis is the general 
scope requirement. The general scope requirement is met if a state-
created claim vindicates “rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive 
 
 97. Id. at 356 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)). 
 98. Id. at 347. 
 99.  Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 100. Id. at 849. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 849–50. 
 105. Id. at 854. 
 106. Id. at 853. 
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rights within the general scope” of section 106 of the Copyright Act.107 
The key to the general scope requirement is equivalency: Courts must 
determine if the plaintiff’s claim vindicates rights that are equivalent108 to 
the rights afforded by section 106 of the Copyright Act. Section 106 
provides authors the exclusive right, among other things, to reproduce 
and distribute copies of a copyrighted work and to prepare derivative 
works based upon the copyrighted work.109 
Many courts employ an “extra elements” test to determine whether 
a state-created cause of action, hot news or otherwise, falls outside of the 
general scope of the Copyright Act.110 This test only comports with § 301 
if those extra elements address the concept of equivalency. But some 
extra elements merely limit “the scope of the claim but leave[] its 
fundamental nature unaltered.”111 These claims are preempted if the state 
right is violated by an act that would, by itself, also violate one of the 
§ 106 rights.112 Thus, “unfair competition, misappropriation, or unjust 
enrichment claims are preempted when based on alleged acts such as 
distribution or reproduction.”113 Even if an element alters the scope of a 
state claim (by, for example, narrowing the pool of eligible plaintiffs), the 
claim remains equivalent to rights vindicated in § 106. Thus, scholars 
suggest a more precise test that asks whether the extra elements create a 
claim that is qualitatively different from—and thus not equivalent to—a 
copyright infringement claim.114 
Conversion is a simple example of a state-created cause of action 
that vindicates rights that are qualitatively different from the rights 
protected by the Copyright Act. In a conversion action, the plaintiff sues 
to recover a physical object that she owns and that the defendant 
possesses. Consider a manuscript, a work clearly within the subject 
matter of the Copyright Act.115 If an author’s only copy of her new 
manuscript is stolen, the author’s only recourse is to sue under a 
conversion theory and have her physical manuscript returned. Section 
106 of the Copyright Act affords the plaintiff no relief. This hypothetical 
 
 107. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. § 106. 
 110. See, e.g., Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating 
that elements altering the “action’s scope but not its nature” are insufficient to avoid preemption); Mayer 
v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same). 
 111. Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306. 
 112. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 113. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 909 (2011) (Raggi, J., 
concurring). See Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306 (stating that the “enrichment element,” like intent or 
awareness, limited the claim’s scope but left its “fundamental nature unaltered”). 
 114. See, e.g., Patry, supra note 54, §§ 18:18–19. 
 115. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
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conversion claim is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement 
claim because it vindicates the author’s exclusive right to possess the 
physical manuscript—but not her exclusive right to copy the manuscript 
or make derivative use of it. Therefore, the conversion claim falls outside 
of the general scope of copyright and is not preempted. Other non-
preempted claims include reverse palming-off, breach of fiduciary 
relationship, and trade secrets.116 
C. Hot News Claims Fall Within the General Scope of the 
Copyright Act 
In NBA, the Second Circuit described three extra elements that 
purportedly save a hot news claim from preemption.117 Those elements 
are “(i) the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free-riding 
by a defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the product or 
service provided by the plaintiff.”118 The NBA opinion failed to explain 
how any of these elements are qualitatively different from a claim based 
on the unauthorized reproduction of factual material. Instead, the court 
erroneously relied on the House Report’s suggestion that hot news 
claims survive preemption.119 The court pole-vaulted this essential part of 
a § 301 inquiry because of the court’s reliance on the House Report. This 
presupposed that a hot news claim should survive preemption, and the 
court then tried to articulate a test that fit that result as opposed to a test 
that fit the statute. 
The court also failed to explain why all three of these elements are 
necessary. Logically, if any one of the elements were qualitatively different 
from rights vindicated by § 106, the claim falls outside of the scope of the 
Copyright Act and the presence of other elements is superfluous. Since the 
court did not analyze whether its extra elements were equivalent to the 
rights provided in § 106, it is necessary to reconstruct that inquiry in order 
to see if NBA identified any element that should allow a hot news claim to 
survive preemption. 
In addition to the three extra elements quoted above, the NBA 
court suggested that two other elements are essential to a hot news claim: 
 
 116. These claims all contain elements that infringe rights that are qualitatively different than 
those in Copyright Act § 106. For example, reverse palming-off requires affirmative acts that deceive 
consumers about the source of an item. None of the exclusive rights in § 106 protect against source 
confusion. Trade secret claims and breach of fiduciary duty claims both involve the breach of a 
confidential relationship. The Copyright Act does not regulate special relationships between parties. 
For an extensive treatment of the subject, see Patry, supra note 54, §§ 18:20–47. 
 117. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 118. Id. Applying these elements to the case at bar, the NBA court held that the NBA’s hot news 
claim was preempted because Motorola expended its own resources to collect factual data about NBA 
games and thus was not free-riding. Id. at 854. 
 119. See supra Part I.B. 
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(1) The “plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost,” and 
(2) “the defendant is in direct competition with a product or service 
offered by the plaintiffs.”120 Some courts have adopted NBA in a five-part 
formulation that incorporates these two extra elements.121 The following 
Subparts analyze all five elements in turn to see if they create a cause of 
action that is qualitatively different from, and thus not equivalent to, the 
rights protected by section 106 of the Copyright Act. In my view, the five 
extra elements merely limit the scope of a claim based on unauthorized 
reproduction, but fail to alter the fundamental nature of that claim. Thus, 
the Copyright Act should preempt a hot news claim in all circumstances. 
1. The Time-Sensitive Value of Factual Information 
The time-sensitive value of factual information is an element that 
narrows the pool of potentially viable infringement actions but does not 
alter their fundamental nature.122 This element reduces the universe of 
potential claims from the unauthorized reproduction of factual material 
to the unauthorized reproduction of hot facts.123 In either case, the nature 
of the claim involves the unauthorized reproduction of facts. Since 
reproduction is one of the rights enumerated in § 106, narrowing the pool 
of unauthorized reproduction claims does not save hot news from 
preemption. The time-sensitive element might also narrow the scope of 
the remedy to the amount of time that the factual information is “hot.” 
However, tinkering with the scope of a remedy is not enough to save a 
state-created cause of action from preemption.124 
Furthermore, the Copyright Act already vindicates an author’s right 
to exploit the time-sensitive value of a copyright because § 106 protects 
an author’s exclusive right to “distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted 
work to the public.”125 For example, in Harper & Row Publishing, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court found copyright infringement 
when The Nation “broke” bits of Gerald Ford’s memoirs to the public 
before his licensee, Time Magazine, had released the same material.126 At 
the time, President Ford’s memoirs were unreleased and they contained 
 
 120. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 845. 
 121. See, e.g., Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 960–62 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 122. Cf. Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 123. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 163 (arguing that the time-sensitive value of factual 
information puts it outside the scope of copyright because “the feature of the work for which the 
claimant is seeking protection—its time sensitivity—is irrelevant to copyrightability”). Ginsburg’s 
argument is flawed because it relies on a modified partial preemption theory—that some features of 
the work are within the subject matter of copyright, but the valuable features of the work are not. Id. 
 124. See Patry, supra note 54, § 18:19. 
 125. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). 
 126. 471 U.S. at 539, 569 (1985). 
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time-sensitive factual information of great public interest.127 The Court 
held that The Nation infringed section 106 of the Copyright Act when it 
copied parts of Ford’s Memoirs and incorporated them into a derivative 
work.128 Despite the quasi-factual nature of President Ford’s autobiography, 
the Supreme Court granted it “thick” copyright protection in order to 
protect the right of first release.129 Thus, Harper & Row supports the 
proposition that section 106 of the Copyright Act vindicates the right to 
exploit the time-sensitive value of factual material that is part of a larger 
copyrightable work. 
On a practical note, if the time-sensitive value of factual information 
made a misappropriation claim qualitatively different from a copyright 
claim, § 301 would be reduced to absurdity because all valuable copyrights 
would fall outside the scope of copyright for however long they were 
“hot.” 
2. Free-Riding by a Defendant 
Free-riding is the heart of a hot news claim because it defines the 
actus reus of the defendant’s allegedly tortious appropriation. There are 
two elements embedded within free-riding: the act of free-riding, and a 
connotation that free-riding is wrong. Neither element vindicates a right 
that is different from the exclusive reproduction rights enshrined in 
section 106 of the Copyright Act. 
First, the act of free-riding falls within the general scope of 
copyright. The Copyright Act’s primary purpose is to protect against 
unlawful copying. As Jane Ginsburg explains, free-riding “may be a 
pejorative description of copying, but it is still copying.”130 In hot news 
cases, the actus reus side of free-riding occurs when the defendant copies 
the plaintiff’s hot facts. For example, in INS, INS copied the facts 
underlying AP’s news stories,131 in NBA, Motorola copied the facts 
underlying NBA basketball games,132 and in Barclays, Theflyonthewall.com 
copied the facts underlying Barclay’s financial reports.133 
Second, the normative description of free-riding as wrongful 
harkens back to a moral—or a sweat-of-the-brow—theory of copyright. 
Those respective theories have been rejected by the Second Circuit and 
the Supreme Court. The fact that a defendant might receive a 
competitive—and perhaps monetary—windfall because it used facts that 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 162. 
 131.  Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 231 (1918). 
 132.  Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843–44 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 133.  Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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another company uncovered through significant investment does not 
make a hot news claim qualitatively different from a copyright claim. As 
the Supreme Court noted, though the defendant’s windfall may seem 
unfair, “this is not some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme. It 
is, rather, the essence of copyright, and a constitutional requirement.”134 
In other words, the unfair or immoral aspects of free-riding are 
contemplated in the Copyright Act. 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit rejected any reliance on the 
amorphous concepts of morality unless morality is directly tethered to a 
legal wrong. “Whether or not reproduction of another’s work is 
‘immoral’ depends on whether such use of the work is wrongful. If, for 
example, the work is in the public domain, then its use would not be 
wrongful.”135 Thus, the second characteristic of free-riding, its immoral 
connotation, does not put a hot news misappropriation claim outside the 
general scope of copyright. 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition suggests that an 
INS-like misappropriation claim survives preemption because a 
systematic pattern of free-riding falls outside the general scope of 
copyright.136 The drafters of the Restatement are incorrect. A systematic 
pattern of free-riding, much like the time-sensitive value of factual 
information, is an element that alters the scope of a misappropriation 
claim without altering its nature. The scope of the claim is narrowed from 
all instances of copying to cases of systematic copying, but the nature of 
the claim is still unauthorized copying. The drafters erred because 
section 106 of the Copyright Act gives authors exclusive rights to prevent 
unauthorized copying whether that copying is done once or on a 
systematic basis. Since the Copyright Act already protects against 
systematic copying, a claim based on systematic copying is equivalent to 
a copyright infringement claim. However, Judge Richard Posner suggests 
that a systematic pattern of free-riding allows a hot news claim to survive 
preemption where that systematic pattern threatens the very existence of 
the industry in question.137 
 
 134. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 135. Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 136. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 38 cmt. c (1997). Note that despite its half-
hearted argument that hot news claims survive § 301 preemption, the restatement disfavors the 
misappropriation doctrine generally because of its tendency to stifle competition. Id. 
 137. See generally Posner, supra note 27. 
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3. Threat to the Very Existence of the Product or Service 
The threat to the very existence of a product or service is a concept 
drawn directly from INS.138 “If services like AP were not assured of 
property rights in the news they pay to collect, . . . [t]he newspaper-
reading public would suffer because no one would have an incentive to 
collect ‘hot news.’”139 Judge Posner suggests that this is the key element 
that allows hot news claims to survive preemption.140 He has argued that 
if unauthorized copying is going to “kill the goose that laid the golden 
eggs,” then state efforts to protect the goose are not preempted.141 Judge 
Posner is incorrect. 
There are two reasons why the threat to the very existence of a 
product or service, as an element, does not vindicate rights that are 
different in kind from section 106 of the Copyright Act. First, the threat 
to the existence of an industry is simply not an act, but is instead the 
result of an act.142 The act is copying and § 106 vindicates the right to 
prevent copying. Second, Congress contemplated the incentive structures 
required to produce copyrightable subject matter when it passed the 
Copyright Act.143 Feist suggests that Congress decided not to protect 
certain types of works144 and, by extension, Feist suggests a legislative 
intent not to protect the industries that invest in producing those works. 
The threat to the very existence of a product or service, as an element, 
does not fundamentally differ from the constitutionally recognized idea 
that incentive is necessary to promote authorship. Section 106 embodies 
the exclusive rights that incentivize authors. Thus, NBA’s third and final 
element does not vindicate rights that are qualitatively different than 
those contained in § 106. 
To summarize, NBA defined three extra elements that save a hot 
news claim from preemption: (i) the time-sensitive value of factual 
information; (ii) free-riding by a defendant; and (iii) the threat to the 
very existence of the product or service.145 None of these three elements 
create a state-law cause of action that is qualitatively different from, and 
thus not equivalent to, section 106 of the Copyright Act.  
 
 138. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918). 
 139. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 140. See generally Posner, supra note 27. 
 141. See id. at 628. 
 142. See Khadder, supra note 59, at 17; see also Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 
650 F.3d 876, 906–07 (2d Cir. 2011) (Raggi, J., concurring). 
 143. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings . . . .”). 
 144. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
 145. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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4.  NBA’s Alternative Five-Part Test 
NBA also discussed a five-part test for hot news preemption.146 The 
five-part test adds two elements to the three elements discussed above: 
(iv) the plaintiff gathers information at some cost; and (v) the parties are in 
direct competition.147 Although some circuits have adopted NBA’s five-
part test,148 the two additional elements fail to save a hot news claim from 
preemption. First, the element that a plaintiff gathers information at 
some cost merely narrows the pool of potential plaintiffs to those who 
have expended resources to gather facts. The gravamen of the claim is 
still copying. The investment of time and resources is in no way unique to 
a hot news claim; it is a common element in most garden-variety copyright 
infringement claims.149 In any event, the Supreme Court rejected sweat of 
the brow as a stand-alone basis for intellectual property in Feist.150 
The element of direct competition between the parties also merely 
narrows the pool of eligible plaintiffs without altering the fundamental 
nature of the claim. Direct competition may have been included because it 
provides evidence that the defendant’s free-riding actually will threaten 
the existence of the plaintiff’s industry or service. While direct competition 
may be an essential element of a hot news claim as a tort, it is not an 
element that makes the claim qualitatively different from a copyright 
claim. 
5. Summary 
The NBA court fundamentally misconceived of the extra elements 
inquiry because it did not link the extra elements test to the equivalency 
language of § 301. Extra elements are only useful when they reveal 
whether a state-created cause of action is truly protecting rights that are 
different in kind from the Copyright Act. If so, then the state claim is not 
equivalent to § 106 and is not preempted. When applied to the five 
elements mentioned in NBA, none of these elements save hot news 
claims from preemption.151 Thus, NBA’s suggestion that a properly 
narrow hot news claim survives preemption is misguided. Hot news 
claims should be preempted by the Copyright Act in all circumstances. 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 845. 
 148. See, e.g., Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 962 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 149. See Patry, supra note 54, § 18:40 (“[I]t will always require some cost or expense to gather 
material.”). If this element were qualitatively different, any state-law cause of action in which a 
plaintiff expended resources would avoid preemption per se. 
 150. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991). 
 151. Even a claim that is narrowed to the facts of INS is preempted by § 301. 
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III.  The Case for Uniform Hot News Preemption 
Following NBA, courts around the country adopted its test as the 
touchstone for hot news preemption.152 However, the vast majority of these 
cases held that the plaintiff’s hot news claim was preempted. One might 
conclude that the current hot news doctrine, while flawed, does little harm. 
But allowing hot news claims to survive in a weakened form is far from 
innocuous. Two recent cases help illustrate the logical and practical 
problems that hot news claims raise. Furthermore, if hot news claims were 
viable, this would cause significant policy problems. Therefore, courts 
ought to discard what vestiges of the hot news doctrine remain in favor of 
uniform hot news preemption. Although it perpetuated some of NBA’s 
logical fallacies, Barclays was a step in the right direction because it 
classified NBA’s three- and five-part tests as dicta. 
A. BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC. V. THEFLYONTHEWALL.COM 
The Second Circuit stepped back onto the center stage of hot news 
with its recent opinion in Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com.153 
In Barclays, several financial service firms (the “Firms”) brought a hot 
news claim against an online news aggregator (“Fly”) that reported the 
Firms’ daily stock recommendations while those recommendations were 
still “hot.”154 These recommendations, which were distributed to a limited 
pool of major investors, were valuable because they were not generally 
known.155 The Firms generated commissions by using their recommendation 
services to persuade major investors to buy and sell stocks.156 
Fly was a financial news aggregator that did not offer the financial 
services or otherwise compete with the Firms.157 Rather, it distributed 
financial information to its subscribers in exchange for subscription and 
ad revenue.158 Fly obtained the Firms’ financial recommendations from 
major investors and then reported those recommendations on its 
website.159 After a three-day bench trial, the district court granted 
judgment in favor of the Firms on their hot news claim and enjoined Fly 
 
 152. See, e.g., Confold Pac., 433 F.3d at 960; Agora Fin., L.L.C. v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499 
(D. Md. 2010); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Pollstar v. 
Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Fred Wehrenberger Circuit of Theatres, Inc. 
v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999); Scranton Times, L.P. v. Wilkes-Barre 
Publ’g Co., No. 3:08-cv-2135, 2009 WL 3100963, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2009). 
 153. 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 154. Id. at 880–82.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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from reporting the Firms’ recommendations “for a period ranging from 
thirty minutes to several hours after they are released by the plaintiffs.”160 
The Second Circuit reversed. There are three key elements to its 
decision. First, the court held that the Firms’ hot news claim was 
preempted because there was no evidence that Fly was free-riding off of 
the Firms’ efforts.161 Just as Motorola was not free-riding off of NBA’s 
products because it collected the facts of NBA games itself, Fly was not 
free-riding because it collected the facts underlying the Firms’ reports 
itself.162 The court distinguished Fly’s actions from the facts in INS 
because INS did not expend its own resources to collect the facts.163 
Second, the court looked to INS for a more nuanced definition of 
free-riding: “[T]he term free-riding refers explicitly to a requirement for 
a cause of action as described by INS. . . . as ‘taking material that has 
been acquired by complainant . . . [through] the expenditure of labor, 
skill, and money, and . . . appropriating it and selling it as [the 
defendant’s] own. . . .’”164 The court used this definition from the INS in 
two ways. First, it distinguished between plaintiffs who expend effort to 
collect facts from plaintiffs who expend effort to create facts.165 For 
example, the AP collected the facts of World War I, whereas the NBA 
created facts by putting on basketball games, and the Firms created facts 
by announcing their daily stock recommendations. The Barclays court 
declared that a defendant free-rides in the INS sense when it 
appropriates facts that the plaintiff collected, but not facts that the 
plaintiff created.166 Thus, the court concluded that Fly did not take an 
INS-like free-ride off of the Firms’ financial reports.167 
The court also used the INS definition of free-riding to suggest that 
there is a reverse palming-off component to free-riding.168 The court 
concluded that because Fly attributed financial recommendations to the 
financial firms, it was not free-riding. But if Fly had claimed the 
recommendations were its own, it would have been free-riding.169 Here 
the court misreads INS. Reverse palming-off is a separate doctrine from 
hot news misappropriation. In fact, Justice Holmes dissented from INS 
because he would have decided the case on reverse palming-off grounds, 
 
 160. Id. at 887. 
 161. Id. at 878. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 903 (final two alterations in original). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 907. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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as opposed to creating a quasi-property right in the news.170 Reverse 
palming-off is likely not preempted by the Copyright Act because that 
tort is based on source confusion, a concept that falls outside the general 
scope of copyright.171 If Fly held out the Firms’ financial 
recommendations as its own, the Firms would have a non-preempted 
reverse palming-off claim. To the extent Barclays reads reverse palming-
off into the elements of a hot news claim, it conflates its tort theories. 
The third and most important feature of Barclays is that it classified 
the NBA hot news test as dicta.172 The court stated: “We think that the 
NBA panel’s decision that the absence of ‘free riding’ was fatal to the 
plaintiff’s claim in that case is binding upon us on the facts presented 
here,” explaining that the “NBA panel decided the case before it, and we 
think that the law it thus made regarding ‘hot news’ preemption is, as we 
have tried to explain, determinative here. But the Court’s various 
explanations of its five-part approach are not.”173 
Thus, the court construed NBA’s hot news test as dicta, but 
suggested without explanation that a properly narrow hot news claim 
survives preemption.174 It is just not clear why. For example, if Motorola 
had copied the scores of contemporaneous basketball games from an 
NBA-owned sports statistics application, would that claim survive 
preemption because Motorola was free-riding? I suggest that the claim 
ought to be preempted based on my previous conclusion that free-riding 
never saves a claim from preemption.175 However, Barclays supports the 
opposite result. Here, Barclays obfuscates more than it clarifies. 
Equivocal precedent is inefficient for parties who may litigate through 
trial and appeal and is a waste of the trial court’s time because the court 
will almost certainly find preemption but cannot dismiss the claim 
outright. 
B.  ASSOCIATED PRESS V. ALL HEADLINE NEWS 
The problems of a dormant hot news doctrine become more acute 
when a well-heeled plaintiff seeks to stifle competition by using litigation 
 
 170. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246–48 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 171. For a full discussion of why reverse palming-off is not preempted by the Copyright Act, see 
Patry, supra note 54, §§ 18:20–47. 
 172. The court also suggested that a three-part iteration of the NBA test is dicta. See Barclays 
Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 899 n.32 (“[The court’s] language regarding 
the elements that might in some later case allow a claim to avoid preemption, and its discussion of why 
such an exception to preemption was narrow, were useful commentaries on the reasoning and possible 
implications of the Court’s holding. But the language itself was not meant to, and did not, bind us, the 
district court, or any other court to subsequently consider this subject.”). 
 173. Id. at 906–07, 899. 
 174. Id. at 898. 
 175. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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to crush a small competitor who may not be able to fund a case past 
summary judgment. In Associated Press v. All Headline News Co. (“AP 
v. AHN”), AP brought a hot news claim against All Headline News Co. 
(“AHN”) because it allegedly hired “‘poorly paid individuals’ to find 
news stories on the internet and prepare them for republication under 
the AHN banner.”176 AHN moved to dismiss, but instead of attacking the 
elements of the hot news claim directly, AHN argued that that Florida 
law governed the case and that Florida did not recognize a hot news 
cause of action.177 The district court disagreed and, after dispatching with 
AHN’s defense to the hot news cause of action in one sentence, denied 
its motion to dismiss.178 Following the court’s order, the parties settled 
the case and AHN agreed to pay AP an undisclosed amount.179 
There are a few takeaways from AP v. AHN. First, deep-pocketed 
plaintiffs like AP can use the hot news cause of action in its current 
weakened form to attack small competitors who use facts that are in the 
public domain. Trial courts that follow Barclays and NBA are stuck with 
the proposition that hot news claims survive preemption if pled correctly. 
Thus, lower courts will have to retain hot news claims through pre-trial 
motions if they are pled accurately and plausibly. Second, small 
companies that appropriate facts and republish those facts are ill situated 
to defend hot news claims. AHN, for example, failed to make a 
compelling attack on the elements of AP’s hot news claim and also 
settled its case without even proceeding to summary judgment. 
Third, a case like AP v. AHN, while non-binding, provides more 
leverage to companies like AP. After the Barclays decision was 
published, AP issued a press release that stated: “The Court contrasted 
[its] facts with a ‘hot news’ complaint that AP had previously brought 
against a media company alleged to have copied AP-gathered news and 
to have published that news as its own, in competition with AP’s 
services.”180 AP was, of course, referring to AP v. AHN. Its press release 
stated further: “Such a case, the Court said, was likely a viable ‘hot news’ 
claim that would not be preempted by the Copyright Act.”181 However, 
 
 176. 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Note that Barclays probably cited AP v. AHN 
because, under the Barclays definition of free-riding, AHN’s actions would not be preempted by the 
Copyright Act. AHN allegedly copied the facts that AP had collected and republished them as its own. 
Barclays, 650 F.3d at 906. 
 177. All Headline News, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
 178. Id. at 461. 
 179. See Elinor Mills, AP, AHN Media Settle Intellectual Property Lawsuit, CNET (July 13, 2009, 
6:11 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10285827-93.html. 
 180. Press Release, Associated Press, AP’s Statement on Barclays Capital Inc. v. 
Theflyonthewall.com, Inc. (June 20, 2011), available at http://www.noodls.com/viewNoodl/10443878/ 
apf---the-associated-press/aps-statement-on-barclays-capital-inc-v-theflyonthewallc. 
 181. Id.; see AP and AHN Media Settle AP’s Lawsuit Against AHN Media and Individual 
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under a proper § 301 analysis, AP’s claim against AHN should be 
preempted by the Copyright Act. Unfortunately, small parties do not 
have the resources to find out and often must settle their cases in the 
shadow of the law. Thus, AP v. AHN illustrates that hot news 
misappropriation claims stifle competition by limiting the competitive 
use of the public domain. 
C.  A Viable Hot News Doctrine Would Cause Significant 
Problems 
In its current form, the hot news doctrine articulated in NBA and 
clarified in Barclays poses two problems: It is both inefficient and 
anticompetitive. If hot news claims became more widespread or more 
successful, the doctrine would stifle free access to facts, threaten the 
uniform application of national laws, and prove difficult for judges to 
administer. 
The hot news doctrine is inefficient, particularly after Barclays, 
because it does not offer a coherent view of a non-preempted hot news 
claim. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that hot news claims are not 
universally preempted, how should a lower court apply the Barclays-
NBA line of cases? Those cases suggest that (1) a theoretical hot news 
claim survives preemption, but (2) a claim is preempted if the defendant 
did not take a free ride, and (3) the three-part NBA test is not 
controlling. However, what should a lower court do if it reviews a case of 
clear free-riding but only some of the NBA elements are met? Barclays 
and NBA do not provide a clear answer. This is partly because of 
inherent logical problems in those opinions, but also because both cases 
found the hot news claim was preempted. Barclays and NBA’s 
preemption holdings are consistent with almost every other hot news 
case since the passage of the Copyright Act. Since courts find preemption 
in almost every hot news case,182 universal preemption would allow courts 
to reach the same result more efficiently, while conserving the parties’ 
resources. 
A viable hot news doctrine is anticompetitive and has very limited 
utility.183 AP v. AHN illustrates the problem of deep-pocketed plaintiffs 
leveraging litigation against small competitors.184 If hot news litigation 
succeeds, those plaintiffs will stifle free access to facts by silencing 
sources that widely disseminate those facts with little public benefit. 
 
Defendants, Associated Press (July 13, 2009), http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-in-the-News/Archive/ 
AP-AHN-Settle-Lawsuit. 
 182. The very few cases that rule in favor of a hot news plaintiff are, as this Note has argued, in 
error. 
 183. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, supra note 136. 
 184. See supra Part III.B. 
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Although the newspaper industry is shrinking faster than any other 
industry in the United States,185 the primary cause is not hot news 
misappropriation. Rather, the public’s news consumption has changed. 
While newspaper circulation and ad revenue have decreased significantly 
over the past decade, digital ad revenue has not filled the void.186 
Revenue from classified ads, once a major source of newspaper revenue, 
has eroded given the rise of websites like craigslist.com.187 Further, while 
newspapers once had geographic monopolies over local readers, the 
Internet now allows consumers to access a wider variety of news sources 
for their national and world news.188 Therefore the hot news doctrine 
would not mitigate the real problems facing the newspaper industry and 
would not ensure that the public has broader access to high quality facts. 
But the doctrine would encroach on the public domain and stifle 
competition. That encroachment is not warranted unless it is justified by 
a tangible public benefit. 
A viable hot news doctrine would also be difficult to administer and 
potentially unpredictable. First, courts are ill-equipped to make 
inherently legislative judgments about which industries deserve hot news 
protection.189 Furthermore, how is a court contemplating a hot news 
injunction supposed to determine the exact length of time news remains 
hot? To the extent that circuits might reach different interpretations, the 
scope of the rights in factual material would be difficult to predict. 
Consider that most news is distributed online to a national audience. If 
the scope of rights varied from state to state, online news distributors 
might have to abide by the laws of the most restrictive state. When taken 
together, the problems inherent in a viable hot news doctrine illustrate 
Judge Posner’s point: “Misappropriation doctrine . . . is alarmingly fuzzy 
once the extreme position of creating a legal right against all free riding 
is rejected.”190 By contrast, section 301 of the Copyright Act was created 
to ensure the uniform application of copyright law, which contemplates 
 
 185. Christopher Zara, Newspaper Industry Shrinks 40 Percent in a Decade: Report, Int’l Bus. 
Times (Sept. 20, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/newspaper-industry-shrinks-40-percent-
decade-report-793706. 
 186. John Barth, How Newspapers Can Survive, CNN (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2012/03/20/opinion/barth-newspapers-decline. 
 187. Jonathan Bailey, Why Newspapers Are Struggling, Plagiarism Today (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2012/06/04/why-newspapers-are-struggling. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Compare Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (declining to 
extend INS to cover “hot” scarf designs), with Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 
101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) (extending misappropriation protection to “hot” opera 
broadcasts). 
 190. Posner, supra note 27, at 638. 
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the distribution of facts. It was specifically designed to prevent a 
patchwork of state regulations. 
Conclusion 
The touchstone of the hot news preemption analysis is the § 301 
two-prong preemption test. In all cases, a hot news claim falls within the 
subject matter of the Copyright Act because these claims concern factual 
information. For a hot news claim to survive preemption then, the court 
must determine whether it contains extra elements that are qualitatively 
different from a copyright claim. In other words, the court must find 
extra elements that vindicate rights that are different from the rights 
protected by section 106 of the Copyright Act. But, as this Note has 
argued, there are no extra elements that place hot news claims outside of 
the general scope of copyright. Thus, even if a district court were 
confronted with the exact facts from INS, a logical general scope inquiry 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not identified a 
cause of action that falls outside the general scope of the Copyright Act. 
Properly understood, § 301’s two-prong inquiry takes precedence over 
dicta from the Second Circuit and § 301’s convoluted legislative history. 
A forward-thinking court of appeals should reject the dicta in Barclays 
and NBA in favor of a clear statement that the Copyright Act uniformly 
preempts hot news misappropriation claims. Uniform preemption is 
supported by the legal system’s strong preference for judicial efficiency, 
free-market competition, and public access to factual information. 
 
